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TENANCY BY THE ENTIRETY
On the other hand, and perhaps..more importantly, the decision clearly
puts public housing officials on notice that their actions in the future will
be subject to judicial scrutiny. Hopefully, this factor will cause public
housing officials to reEvaluate their attitudes and to bring their policies
into line with the goals and purposes underlying the public housing pro-
gram.
56
Advocates of the system of justice found in the United States have
often compared it favorably with judicial practices in other countries.
Yet that very system has too often permitted those of our citizens who
are dependent on government assistance in such areas as public housing to
be treated "as nonpersons in a constitutional sense; as persons who have,
in return for welfare payments, surrendered to the state's social workers
their constitutional rights to privacy and personal security. ' '1 7 To permit
this state of affairs to continue would be intolerable.
We need not go so far as to embrace the argument that the state has a
constitutional duty to provide its indigent citizens with support; but if
the state chooses to do so, it must proceed with careful regard to the
rights of the recipients, for they, too, are persons within our constitu-
tional scheme. Indeed, it may be that in the final analysis, a nation is
measured-perhaps its future is determined-not by the protection
which its institutions afford to the rich and strong, but by the meticulous
care with which the rights of the weak and humble are safeguarded. 58
MICHAEL R. ABEL
Real Property-Tenancy by the Entirety in Real Property
During Marriage
In determining the respective rights and interests of husband and wife
(H and W) in jointly held real property, the common law accepted lit-
erally the Biblical statement that H and W are one. This legal fiction of
"unity of person" was utilized to vest title to the real property in H and
W simultaneously, i.e., both owned the whole estate with neither holding
"" "Because serious injury attends eviciton from public housing, the threat
of termination is a dangerous weapon. Used carelessly, it can create a hostile,
bitter atmosphere in a housing project. Tenants, made to feel insecure, begin
to distrust each other as well as project officials."
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a divisible portion.' This estate is called a tenancy by the entirety and is
presently recognized in twenty-two jurisdictions,2 but its incidents have
been modified in most states.3
The common law incidents of tenancy by the entirety can be sum-
marized as follows: H alone had the right to manage and control the
property and was entitled to all rents and profits without having to
account to W. He could thus lease, mortgage, or convey the property,
but subject to W's contingent right of survivorship. Although H's credi-
tors could reach his right to the rents and profits during the marriage, W's
creditors had no recourse against the property during coverture. The
estate was, however, liable for the joint obligations of H and W. Each
spouse had a contingent right of survivorship that could not be defeated by
either spouse alone during the marriage. On the death of either H or W,
the right of survivorship vested the entire fee in the surviving spouse. If
W survived, she was not bound by any encumbrance of the realty in which
she did not join.4 Thus, the basic theory of the tenancy of the entirety at
common law was that there was unity of the spouses with H in control
of the realty.
Decisions of the North Carolina Supreme Court show that North
4 R. POWELL, REAL PROPERTY 621-24 (1968) [hereinafter cited as POWELL] ;
Huber, Creditors' Rights in Tenancies by the Entireties, 1 B.C. IND. & Com. L.
REV. 197 (1960); Lee, Tennacy by the Entirety in North Carolina, 41 N.C.L. REV.
67 (1962) ; Phipps, Tenancy by Entireties, 25 TEMP. L.Q. 24 (1951) [hereinafter
cited as Phipps]. Tenancies by the entirety and joint tenancies with survivorship
should not be confused. The basic distinction is that an estate by the entirety can
only exist between H and W, whereas a joint tenancy may exist between any num-
ber of persons with each tenant having a specific and identifiable interest. In a joint
tenancy the interest of each tenant may be executed against for his debts. In most
entirety jurisdictions this is not the case. Id. at 35-41; POWELL 616-18.
2 POWELL 621, at 685 n.7. MISS. CODE ANN. § 834 (1956) allows creation of a
tenancy by the entirety with right of survivorship if it manifestly appears that the
estate was intended. Cuevas v. Cuevas, - Miss. -, 191 So. 2d 843 (1966).
'In Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida, Indiana, Kentucky, Missouri,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont, Virginia, and Wyoming the common law has
been modified so that there is joint use and disposition of the rents and profits. See
Phipps 46-57. One writer includes Tennesssee and Maryland in this group. Id.
Seven jurisdictions have gone even further and hold that each spouse is entitled to
one-half the rents and profits, and use. Pilip v. United States, 186 F. Supp. 397
(D. Alas. 1960); Franks v. Wood, 217 Ark. 10, 228 S.W.2d 480 (1950); In re
Dean's Trust, 47 Hawaii 629, 394 P.2d 432 (1964) (inference); Wardrop v.
Wardrop, 211 Md. 14, 124 A.2d 576 (1956); Dvorken v. Barrett, 100 N.J. Super.
306, 241 A.2d 841 (1968) ; College Point Say. Bank v. Tomlinson, 42 Misc. 2d 1061,
249 N.Y.S.2d 938 (Sup. Ct. 1964); Brownley v. Lincoln County, 218 Ore. 7, 343
P.2d 529 (1959). But see POWELL 623 at 703, and Phipps 46-57, who cite only
Arkansas, New Jersey, New York, and Oregon in this group.
'Material cited note 1 supra; contra, Note, 14 RUTGERS L. REv. 457 (1960).
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Carolina is a "strong" tennacy by the entirety state, i.e., North Carolina
adheres to the foregoing common law incidents.5 Despite its well estab-
lished traditions, however, changing times continue to produce new situa-
tions with which the tenancy must deal. This note will examine some
of the continued legal problems raised by the estate by the entirety in real
property in North Carolina during the joint lives of the spouses.
The extent of modern day marital problems was unfamiliar to the
common law history of the tenancy by the entirety. In today's setting,
however, it has been necessary to deal by statute with the effect of the
estate on W's right to alimony. Rents and profits from entirety property
in North Carolina may be charged with the support of W in an action for
alimony or alimony pendente lite without divorce.6 A prior statute
allowed the court to issue a writ of possession that gave W control of the
property so that she could apply the rents and profits, when they had
accrued and become personalty, to pay the alimony and counsel fees. Yet,
W could not get title to the property. Under a new statute enacted by
the 1967 General Assembly,' if W is separated from H and is seek-
ing alimony or alimony pendente lite without divorce, the superior
court can order payment to W by transfer of title or possession of
personal property, or an interest therein, or by a security interest in or
possession of real property.9 A subsection'0 gives the court power to order
transfer of title to real property under N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 1-277 and
1-278. Thus, in this domestic setting, the tenancy by the entirety can be
conveyed to W by the superior court without the joinder or consent of
H, thereby establishing a statutory exception to the common law rule of
exclusive possession and control by H during the marriage.
A voluntary transfer of entirety property by both spouses terminates
the tenancy and the proceeds are held by H and W as tenants in common.
Where the transfer is involuntary, however, more serious problems may
arise.' In North Carolina Highway Commission v. Myers,'2 the proceeds
from the condemnation of entirety property were deposited with the clerk
of superior court. W brought an action seeking a greafer condemnation
Nesbitt v. Fairview Farms, Inc., 239 N.C. 481, 80 S.E.2d 472 (1954).
'Porter v. Citizens Bank, Inc., 251 N.C. 573, 111 S.E.2d 904 (1960).
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-17 (1966).
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.7 (Supp. 1967).
9Id.
'I1d. (c).
"Wilson v. Ervin, 227 N.C. 396, 42 S.E.2d 468 (1947).
"270 N.C. 258, 154 S.E.2d 86 (1967).
19691
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award from the state, but also asked that a portion of the deposit be
distributed to her pending her current action for alimony without divorce.
The North Carolina Supreme Court ruled that an involuntary conveyance
of title did not destroy the estate; the compensation award had the same
status as the real property that had been owned by the entireties. Thus,
W had no present right to any portion of the proceeds since neither spouse
has a separate interest in the entirety realty.
The North Carolina Supreme Court has also ruled that a private sale
under a state statute"3 authorizing such sale when land is held by the en-
tireties and one spouse is incompetent, is an involuntary transfer. 4 The
court held that the entirety nature of the estate was not destroyed, but that
the right of survivorship attached to the fund. It was further held, how-
ever, that H held the corpus as trustee for the survivor." Thus, where W
is incompetent, her interest in the proceeds from an involuntary sale of the
entirety property is protected by H's fiduciary status. In the typical situa-
tion, however, W, even though competent, can not protect her interest
in the entirety realty or the proceeds. If W continues to live with H even
though there are serious marital difficulties, or where she is separated from
H but not seeking alimony, her contingent interest could be destroyed.
The proceeds from an involuntary sale are paid to H and he would
continue to be legally entitled to control the proceeds since they represent
the real property. In these latter situations there is no safeguard after
payment to prevent an inconsiderate or irresponsible H from wasting the
entire proceeds, thereby destroying W's contingent right of survivorship,
which could not have been defeated by H's individual attempt to convey
the realty itself.
One solution to this problem would be to hold H as trustee of in-
voluntary sale proceeds for the survivor, even when W is competent, rather
than simply giving the proceeds to him with no safeguards. Under such
an approach, H would at least be bound by the usual rules of conduct for
a fiduciary and could be made to account if he was delinquent in his duties
as trustee. Even then, however, a judicial decree would be of little
comfort or benefit to W if H were insolvent or without assets.
In order to provide W with protection when there is disharmony
in the marriage, the fund could be deposited in a savings account in the
name of H and W as tenants by the entirety with H entitled to the
" N.C. GEN. STAT. 35-14 (1935).
"'Perry v. Jolly, 259 N.C. 306, 130 S.E.2d 654 (1963).
" Id. at 314, 130 S.E.2d at 661.
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interest during the spouses' joint lives and with the survivor entitled to
the cash account. A more ideal arrangement might be to authorize the
superior courts by statute to appoint a bank or savings and loan company
as trustee to invest the fund from an involuntary transfer and order it
to pay a reasonable return to H with the remainder being accumulated
to be paid with the principal to the survivor. Under either arrangement,
H continues to be entitled to the profits from the estate, but the desired
protection is provided for W's contingent right of survivorship.
In determining the respective rights of the spouses to insurance
proceeds, North Carolina does not treat the loss of insured entirety prop-
erty as an involuntary transfer. The North Carolina Supreme Court
ruled in Carter v. Continental Insurance Company1 6 that although the
H had an insurable interest in entirety property,
since the proprietary interest of the husband was an inseparable part of
the single-entity title held in unity by him and the wife, his insurable
interest ran to the whole property and covered the entire estate ...
[T]he loss benefits created thereby inured to the entire estate .... 17
Since an absolute divorce had terminated the estate subsequent to the
fire, the court held W was entitled to one-half the proceeds."' In a recent
decision,1 the North Carolina Court of Appeals held that insurance
proceeds from entirety property received before divorce is personal prop-
erty, there being no involuntary conversion. The H had requested that
the fund be deposited in joint savings accounts to the credit of H and
W with right of survivorship, but with the interest payable to H. The
court upheld the trial court's determination that one-half was to be dis-
tributed to each spouse.
Thus, even if a spouse paid all the premiums and had the policy issued
in his name alone, the spouse still could not insure to the exclusion of the
other spouse. In the insurance area, the "oneness" of the spouses requires
that the insurance policy, although purchased by one spouse through a
contract with a third party, belongs to both. As a practical matter, the
loss of the insured structure can result in a diminution of the rents and
1 242 N.C. 578, 89 S.E.2d 122 (1955). Accord, Shores v. Rabon, 251 N.C. 790,
112 S.E.2d 556 (1960) (dictum).
2242 N.C. at 580, 89 S.E.2d at 124. But see Henderson v. Stuart, 221 N.C. 3'7,
18 S.E.2d 705 (1942) (holding H had the right to use some of the proceeds of a fire
policy to pay individual indebtedness).
"8 For a thorough discussion of the Carter case, see Note, Fire Insurance-Estates
by the Entirety-Insurable Interest-Right to Proceeds, 35 N.C.L. REv. 134 (1956).
10 Forsyth County v. Plemmons, 2 N.C. App. 373, 163 S.E.2d 97 (1968).
19691
NORT1I CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
profits going to H, even though the land is still there. It would seem
therefore that H, if he pays all the premiums should be entitled to all
the insurance proceeds.
One of the most fertile sources of problems continuing to arise under
the tenancy by the entirety is the broad area of creditors' claims. North
Carolina has consistently followed the common law immunity of the
entirety estate to the separate debts of the spouses, even recently applying
it to a political subdivision's attempts to avoid this incident. In Duplin
County v. Jones2 land was owned by the entirety, but listed on the tax
records in the name of H alone. A county tax on separate personal prop-
erty owned by H and by W was not paid. The court held that no lien
attached to the tenancy by the entirety because of the unpaid tax levied
upon either spouse's separately owned property. Not only a private credi-
tor then, but the state, can be frustrated by this incident of the estate in
attempting to satisfy a claim.
Determining when one spouse alone acts for both is important to
the creditor seeking to levy execution on entirety property for a joint
obligation. North Carolina is in accord with the general rule that marriage
alone does not make one spouse the agent of the other.2 In General Air
Conditioning Company v. Douglass,22 H had contracted with the plaintiff
to install a number of heating systems in homes constructed by H, a
builder, and owned by the entirety. The plaintiff alleged that H was the
agent of W in entering the written contract in question for the installation
of the heating system in a home built for resale by H. The plaintiff
thereby hoped to be able to levy execution upon the entirety property
to satisfy what then would be a joint obligation. The plaintiff had knowl-
edge, however, that all property was owned by the entireties, yet he
admitted that he dealt exclusively with H, never talking to or reaching
any agreement with W. A judgment of nonsuit for W was sustained.
The court said that marriage did not make H the agent of W, nor did it
create a presumption of agency. 23 To establish agency, said the court, it
had to be proven. The court also found no evidence of ratification by word
2267 N.C. 68, 147 S.E.2d 603 (1966).
"E.g., Lo Medico v. Simkowitz, 158 A.2d 681 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1960);
Wohlmuther v. Mt. Airy Plumbing & Heating, Inc., 244 Md. 321, 223 A.2d 562
"(1966) ; Vaughn v. Great American Ins. Co., 390 S.W.2d 622 (Mo. App. 1965);
Falk v. Krumm, 39 Misc. 2d 448, 240 N.Y.S.2d 653 (Sup. Ct. 1963); Godwin Bldg.
Supply Co. v. Hight, 268 N.C. 572, 151 S.E.2d 50 (1966).
"2241 N.C. 170, 84 S.E.2d 828 (1954).
2 Id. at 173, 84 S.E.2d at 831.
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or act of W. Neither could estoppel apply since no proof was offered that
W by her words or conduct represented to anyone that H was her agent
in the transaction.
As the rule now stands concerning agency between the spouses in
North Carolina, a correct result was rendered under the facts of the
Douglass case. However, where W is directly benefited by the work per-
formed the question of agency is more difficult to resolve. Grant v.
Arti1 4 involved a suit brought against H and W for the price of electrical
equipment and its installation in a dwelling that was owned by the en-
tireties. Without reviewing the evidence below or even citing Douglass,
the court in a per curiam opinion held that the evidence was sufficient to
go to the jury for a determination of the question of whether W was a
party to the contract for the services performed. Because the facts are not
fully set forth it is hard to distinguish a difference between Artis and
Douglass. The only apparent distinction between them is that there was
a direct benefit to W from H's actions in Artis, since the equipment was
installed in a home that was occupied as a dwelling by the couple and not
just held for resale as in Douglass. The record of appeal of the Artis
case shows that the W had pointed out to the plaintiff where she wanted
the stove to go in the house and where she wished other electrical outlets
located.25 The evidence was in conflict as to whether both H and W agreed
with the plaintiff to pay for the work, but the jury found for the plaintiff.
The Douglass decision is a good example of an individual creditor of
one spouse being prevented by the device of the entirety estate from collect-
ing on his debt. Since Artis, however, a creditor may be able to at least
get to the jury on some agency theory, even if W did not sign a writing,
if W derived some direct benefit from the contract or if the creditor can
show that W knew of the work and did not object. Also, the theory of
ratification or estoppel is available on the proper set of facts.2"
24253 N.C. 226, 116 S.E.2d 383 (1960).
" Brief for Appellant at 3, Grant v. Artis, 253 N.C. 226, 116 S.E.2d 383 (1960).
"' Pennsylvania's rule is unique and seems to better balance the interest involved
in the agency question. In J.R. Christ Constr. Co. v. Olevsky, 426 Pa. 343, 232 A.2d
196 (1967), H rented heavy equipment to grade farm land owned by the entirety
to build a riding ring for their personal enjoyment. W had knowledge of the work,
but she was not involved in the business transaction. The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court affirmed a judgment for the plaintiff construction company and ruled that
there is a presumption
with respect to properties held by the entireties ... that during the term of.a
marriage, either spouse has the power to act for both without specific author-
ity, so long as the benefits of such action inure to both. This presumption
... does not require knowledge on the part of the other'spouse in question,
19691 ,
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A tenancy by the entirety naturally lends itself to abuse by persons
trying to escape creditors because of the property's immunity from levy
for either spouse's separate debts. A debtor in North Carolina, however,
can not defraud creditors by intentionally transferring his separate land
to himself and his W as tenants by the entirety in order to avoid levy on
the land for his debts." The conveyance is deemed fraudulent on the
theory that but for the conveyance the asset would have been a source
from which creditors had a right to be paid.2"
The North Carolina Supreme Court held in Winchester-Simmons
Company v. Cuttler29 that a conveyance by H and W of entirety property
to a grandaughter was not fraudulent, even though the purpose and intent
of the transfer was to prevent creditors from levying on the realty should
H survive. W was in poor health at the time of the conveyance, and died
soon thereafter. The court said that when the entirety land was conveyed
H had only a contingent right of survivorship which could not be sold
to satisfy the judgment.30 Seven years after Cuttler, the court, follow-
ing the common law rule, held in Lewis v. Pate1 that creditors of H
could levy upon the rents and profits of the estate to which H alone was
entitled to satisfy his debts. 2 As a result of these two rulings, if the
property conveyed to the granddaughter in C'uttler had been producing
rents and profits, the important question arises whether the conveyance
then would have been fraudulent since the creditors would be denied this
present interest upon which to levy execution. The North Carolina Su-
preme Court chose recently not to avail itself of an opportunity to consider
this question, and it was left to a concurring opinion to provide the
probable answer.
In L & M Gas Company v. Leggetts3 a judgment lien was obtained
against H when land was held by the entirety. Subsequently H conveyed
his interest to W. The judgment creditor sought to have the conveyance
set aside as fraudulent. The court sustained a demurrer to the complaint,
but only that it may be rebutted if, in fact, the spouse so acting was not
authorized to act by the other spouse.
Id. at 345, 232 A.2d at 199.
" Sills v. Morgan, 217 N.C. 662, 9 S.E.2d 518 (1940).
2 L & M Gas Co. v. Leggett, 273 N.C. 547, 161 S.E.2d 23 (1968).
199 N.C. 709, 155 S.E. 611 (1930).
80 Id. at 714, 155 S.E. at 613.
81212 N.C. 253, 193 S.E. 20 (1937).
" A receiver will not be appointed to rent the property in order to pay creditor's
claims. Grabenhoffer v. Garrett, 260 N.C. 118, 131 S.E.2d 675 (1963).3273 N.C. 547, 161 S.E.2d 23 (1968).
OPEN-MARKET TRANSACTIONS
reiterating that a tenancy by the entirety is not subject to the separate
debts of either spouse. Justice Sharp in a concurring opinion 4 said the
main question was whether it would be a fraudulent conveyance for a
debtor H to convey to W his interest in income producing property held
by the entirety. She concluded that such a transfer would not be fraudu-
lent. She reasoned that land owned by the entireties is not subject to the
claims of either spouse's creditors and an individual creditor's lien can
not attach to the property unless the debtor spouse survives. The income,
rents, and profits are personalty, not realty. In conveying his interest to
W, H transfers the realty, which includes as an incident the right to all
the profits, but does not actually convey the personalty. Therefore the
transfer is not fraudulent since the property conveyed, i.e., entirety prop-
erty, could not be reached initially by the creditors to satisfy any indi-
vidual claims against H.
This conclusion may initially seem unfair to creditors, but it is the
only reasonable one considering the relevant incident of the estate by the
entirety, i.e., immunity from individual debts of the spouses. Since the
spouses can convey the entire fee to a third party, they should be able
together to convey the fee to either one or the other. If its income pro-
ducing nature were to prevent the transfer of the entirety property be-
cause a fraud on creditors, the practical effect would be a restraint on
alienation since potential purchasers would be concerned that a transfer
could be set aside by creditors. The contrary argument, of course, is that
the conveyance can be set aside only if it was made with the intent to
defraud or hinder creditors. Thus, H and W need only negate any proof
of intent to overcome the voiding of the transfer.
3 5
ROBERT A. WICKER
Securities Regulation-Application of Rule lob-5 to Open-Market
Transactions
Securities trading in the United States is growing each year. Daily
volume on the New York Stock Exchange now averages in excess of ten
Id. at 553, 161 S.E.2d at 28.
Since H alone is entitled to the rents and profits, if he assigned only his right
to the income, individual creditors might successfully contend that this was a fraudu-
lent transfer, provided the intent to defraud were present. In this instance H con-
veys not the land, but the personal property itself to defraud creditors, and the court
has ruled that the rents and profits can be reached by individual creditors.
19691
